The question of whether Islam and common individual rights are compatible has been sat often by scholars in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.1 Some scholars and political activists view these traditions as fundamentally incompatible, arguing that Islam presents a premodern appropriate construction, on the main one give, and common individual rights presents a modern appropriate construction, on the other. Other skeptics view “individual rights” as a european colonial technology used to oppress Muslims by creating them comply with particular european norms Tafsir al ahlam
. Yet the others esteem the Islamic convention as the highest manifestation of individual rights, and engage in apologetic explanations of the individual rights aspects of the established tradition.
To be able to greater understand the genesis and selection of scholarship associated with this topic, that page examines post-Second Earth War individual rights discourse and Muslim reactions in ways that contextualizes the specific areas of conflict and agreement. Historically, many Muslims have used the individual rights discourse of inviolability to supporter for spiritual flexibility and sex equality, while the others, especially Muslim spiritual and political elites, purchased the individual rights discourse of pride to fight for spiritual exclusivism and respect for patriarchal norms. These disagreements have illumined the legacy of the modern european rights convention (p. 820) for common individual rights discourse, and highlighted unresolved issues about european power and political effect in a postcolonial context. These tensions are reflected specifically declarations and treatises that handle individual rights from an Islamic perspective, and in scholarship that deals with this topic.
Through the page, I identify four standard paradigms in scholarship on Islam and individual rights: (1) a type that liberties a secular (non-religious) paradigm for rights; (2) a Muslim apologist model, which liberties a purely “Islamic” conception of rights around secular versions; (3) a Marxist/postcolonial review of rights as a european imposition of power; and (4) a Muslim reformist paradigm of rights that shows details of continuity between european appropriate and Muslim appropriate traditions. These four descriptions are not exhaustive, and some thinkers and groups may match more than one description. Over all, these categories are useful methods for considering consistent developments in the discourse of individual rights and Islam.
I. Human Rights
The financial and political international turmoil that culminated in two earth conflicts generated the founding in 1945 of the United Countries (UN) in San Francisco and the ensuing Charter of the United Nations. The usage of the Universal Affirmation of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 taken care of immediately the necessity to state some ethical and appropriate criteria that can affirm the pride and inviolability of the individual person. The atrocities of fascism and Nazism, exclusively the Holocaust, offered the immediate context for this kind of document. Johannes Morsink discussed how various articles of the Affirmation were drafted exclusively in reaction to Nazi techniques and appropriate policies. For example, Articles 6 through 12 of the UDHR handled appropriate individual rights, which recognized that before and throughout the conflict, German law had been totally Nazified. A number of the associates, particularly the delegate from Lebanon, worried that “law” could possibly be deformed to justify any training of the state.2 The proven fact that law could possibly be exploited as a legitimizing vehicle for power might continue being a problem specifically for postcolonial critics of european hegemony to the twenty-first century.
The requirement to defend individuals from racist discrimination, if it was straight enforced or tacitly reinforced by their state, prolonged beyond the European context. Legalized racial segregation proliferated in equally mid-twentieth-century (p. 821) Southern United States and South Africa, for example. Member parties of the United Countries discussed a commitment to enumerating an individual’s rights equally within and, if necessary, against the state. The creating procedure for the Affirmation (1946–48) coincided with the breakup of colonial empires, and associates from former colonies elevated issues about how most readily useful to utilize individual rights to customers of then-present or former colonial territories.
The creation of the UDHR sticks out as a watershed time in european conceptions of rights, primarily due to its international character as a reply to atrocities carried on an enormous scale. The Affirmation presents a departure from a European type of political rights used by people by virtue of these citizenship in a particular territory or country. Anthony Pagden argued this understanding of the rights of man, common all through European colonial growth, “turned increasingly useless as a idea in international or intercultural relations.”3 Hence, Pagden argued, Steve Stuart Mill can only speak with full confidence of “rights” in just a “civilization.” The functions of the 2nd Earth War, as well as the disintegration of European empires, generated the discrediting with this view of rights. A unique feature of the UDHR was their focus on, and appeal to, individual organization separate from the individual’s political community.